

NDIA Expeditionary Warfare Conference

Anti-terrorism Threats and Capabilities



Capt (sel) Tom Dee, USN CNO N757 EOD and Coastal Warfare Branch 703-602-8584



N757 Charter

- Develop capabilities to mitigate asymmetric threats to expeditionary operations
 - Explosive Ordnance Disposal
 - Naval Coastal Warfare
 - Mobile Security Force
 - Non-Lethal Weapons Program
 - Expeditionary ATFP









Threat: Old Assumptions

- Individual terrorists or groups
- Isolated acts
- Not coordinated
- Not sophisticated





Threat: New Reality

- Strategic "anti-access" campaign
- Well resourced and trained
- Global capability
- Creative and adaptable







Threat: OOB



Large Improvised Devices

- All types of fillers
 - conventional HE
 - CBR materials
 - Opportunistic
- Any method of delivery
- Mines / Limpets
- Standoff weapons
- Shootings
- Kidnapping
- Direct action









First Principles

- Cultural Change
- Situational Awareness
- Operational Risk Management
- Defense in Depth
- Requires:
 - Doctrine
 - Tactics
 - Technology
 - Resources






Defense in Depth

- Concentric security zones
 - Assessment
 - Warning
 - Threat

- **US**
- Host Nation





Essential Tasks

- Define assessment / warning / threat radius
- Establish perimeters
- Patrol perimeters
- Conduct surveillance
- Classify / ID suspect vehicles, boats, acft
- Intercept / interrogate / determine intent
- Engage hostiles
- Locate and ID suspect packages placed prior to arrival
- Render safe terrorist devices



Capability Limitations

Force Structure:


- Force level to sustain elevated FPCON
- Mobile security forces

Technology:

- Barriers
- Underwater Search
- IED & CBRN detection and identification
- Near shore surveillance and interdiction
 - Air
 - Surface
 - Sub-surface
- Classification / IFF

• Tactics:

Integration of non-lethal capability





EXW AT Capable Forces

• EOD

Marine Mammals

• NCW

Mobile Security Forces





Navy EOD Mission Areas



Mine Countermeasures (MCM)





Very Shallow Water MCM (VSW MCM)



Force Protection


- •Improvised Explosive Device Detection/ Neutralization
- •WMD detection, diagnostics, defeat
- •Ordnance Detection/Neutralization/Training
- •Hazard Mitigation



Explosive Ordnance Disposal

• MISSION: Eliminate the threat of hazardous ordnance and terrorist devices to enable operations in any environment.

Threat



Task

Underwater Ordnance

Naval Mines
Surface Ordnance
Air Ordnance
Chemical Weapons
Nuclear Weapons
Improvised Devices



Detect
Locate
Access
Identify
Render Safe
Exploitation/Intel
Dispose



Marine Mammal Systems

Operational

• Mk 6 Swimmer Detection System: Atlantic Bottlenose dolphins to detect and mark surface swimmers, SCUBA divers, closed circuit divers, and Swimmer Delivery Vehicles (SDV).

Prototype

• Shallow Water Intruder Detection System (SWIDS): California Sea Lions to detect and mark surface swimmers, SCUBA and closed circuit divers in restricted waters.









Naval Coastal Warfare

• Mission: Force Protection of strategic shipping and naval vessels operating in the inshore / coastal area, anchorages, harbors and harbor facilities through surface & subsurface surveillance







NCW Operational Forces

NCW Group One:


San Diego, CA

- 11 MIUWU
- 7 IBU Units
- 4 HDC Units

NCW Group Two:

Williamsburg. VA

- 11 MIUWU
- 7 IBU Units
- 5 HDC Units



3050 Selected Reserves / almost 6% of the Surface Reserve 188 Active duty personnel



Mobile Security Force

• Mission: Protect deployed U.S. Navy ships, aircraft, and other DON units against terrorist attack in locations where U.S. shore infrastructure does not exist or requires augmentation.



Concept

- Modular elements capable of tailored tasks
- CINCs specify mission tasks considering:
 - THREATCON
 - HN support and restrictions
 - Scope and duration of ops
 - **ROE**
- Seamless integration of:
 - Advance force
 - Command element
 - HN security forces
 - Security elements
 - Protected assets





Challenges

• The Contest of Will for Access and Influence

- Challenged by existing programs, limited resources, warfare culture.
- Leadership required to refocus Navy on AT/FP as a warfighting priority
- Mainstreaming AT/FP ~ Mainstreaming MIW?









Questions?

